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 Despite significant advances in the terrorism literature since the September 11th attacks, 
there remains very little research into the processes by which terrorism might come to a peaceful 
end. The present study addresses this gap in the literature by investigating politicization, a 
process by which terrorist organizations negotiate with authorities and the two parties enter a 
peace agreement or otherwise agree to cease hostilities. The study explores the politicization 
outcome as predicted by important organizational and behavioral characteristics that prior 
literature identifies as affecting how terrorist groups end, including group size, organization 
lifespan, target type for terroristic activities, and the breadth of organizational goals. The key 
contribution of the current study is a focus on the presence of a non-violent political affiliate 
(NVPA) within a broader terrorist organization and the role these affiliates play in predicting 
politicization. Multivariate logistic regression analysis finds strong evidence of a relationship 
between the presence of a NVPA and politicization, as well as between group size and political 
cessation of terrorist activities. To elaborate on those findings, a brief case study/typology 
illustrates these linkages using both historical and contemporary terrorist organizations as 
examples. I conclude by discussing the role of NVPAs in understanding the terrorist 
organizational life cycle broadly, as well as directions for future research that extend key themes 












TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………… 1 
Statement of Problem ..................................................................................................................... 1  
The Empirical Boundaries of Terrorism ........................................................................................ 4  
Theoretical Orientation …………………………………………………………………..……… 5 
 Rational Choice Theory ………………………………………………………………… 5 
 Open-Systems Theory …………………………………….…………………………....... 7 
Review of Prior Literature ………………………………………………………………......….. 8  
Environmental Factors Condition Terrorist Longevity ………………………………… 8 
 Behavioral and Organizational Factors Condition Terrorist Longevity ………………. 10 
Gaps In Knowledge …………………………………………………………………….. 12 
Parameters of the Current Study ……………………………………………………………….. 14 
 Data …………………………………………………………………………………….. 14 
 Unit of Analysis ……………………………………………………………………….... 15 
 Dependent Variable ……………………………………………………………………. 15 
 Focal Independent Variable: Non-Violent Political Affiliates ………………………… 16 
 Additional Control Variables ………………………………………………………….. 17 
 Hypotheses ……………………………………………………………………………... 18 
Results ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 20 
 Descriptive Statistics …………………………………………………………………… 20 
 Bivariate Analysis ……………………………………………………………………… 21 
 Multivariate Models: Predicting Politicization ………………………………………... 23 
A Typology of Terrorist Group Ends: NVPA and Politicization ……………………………… 26 
 
 Type One: Groups That Contained an NVPA and Politicized ………………………… 27 
 Type Two: Groups That Contained an NVPA, but Did Not Politicize ………………… 28 
 Type Three: Groups That Did Not Contain an NVPA, but Politicized ………………… 30 
 Type Four: Groups That Did Not Contain an NVPA and Did Not Politicize …………. 32 
Discussion ……………………………………………………………………………………… 33 
 Revisiting the Typologies: Exceptions to the NVPA-Politicization Link …….………… 36 
 Limitations and Directions for Future Research ………………………………………. 38 
Works Cited ……………………………………………………………………………………. 40 






In the years since the September 11th attacks, most Americans have viewed terrorism as 
necessarily destructive and inherently unforgivable. Indeed, the American public has recently 
ranked terrorism as its number one foreign policy concern (Pew Research Center, 2016). This 
should come as no surprise given the immense scope, both temporally and geographically, of 
terrorism: major terrorist incidents have featured prominently throughout U.S. history, while 
recent deaths related to terrorist attacks internationally have more than tripled since 2001 (GTD, 
2020). Given the heightened threat posed by terrorist organizations in recent history, 
governments and police agencies in the United States and abroad are increasingly pooling their 
resources to develop successful counterterrorism strategies (Belasco, 2018). These strategies 
have been varied in their results (Jones and Libicki, 2008), but point to an important – and 
somewhat under-developed – question: when and under what conditions do terrorist groups 
end/abandon violence?  
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Despite advances made in describing why terrorist groups arise (Crenshaw, 1981; 
Newman, 2005), how they attract resources (Crenshaw, 1981; FitzGerald, 2004; Rushchenko, 
2019), and the geographic spaces in which they operate (Gruenewald, Drawve, and Smith 2019; 
Onat and Gul, 2018), there remains little consideration of the process by which terrorist groups 
end through negotiation. Indeed, policymakers often negotiate with terrorist groups (Cronin, 
2011), and for good reason: globally, 43 percent of terrorist groups eventually decide to 
negotiate, either with the state or with subnational groups, for a peaceful end to hostilities (Jones 
and Libicki, 2008). However, empirical research exploring the creation of political channels 




roles that novel organizational features and unconventional group affiliations play in facilitating 
negotiation between the state and subnational authorities. 
Such an empirical gap stems from a broader dearth of knowledge regarding the non-
violent means through which terrorist organizations are incorporated or connected to local, 
regional, or state political institutions. Many terrorist organizations, for example, abandon 
violence in exchange for legitimate political representation through a political party or a 
parliamentary body (i.e. when the IRA agreed to cease its terrorist campaign in exchange for 
representation in a reformed Irish government). Others negotiate a peaceful settlement with 
authorities in exchange for political concessions without representation. The proposed study 
builds on these observations and asks the following: how does non-violent political affiliation (or 
the non-violent political affiliates of a terrorist) relate to politicization, or the negotiated end of 
terrorism? 
Answering this question has important implications for academic research and global 
counterterrorism policy. First, examining the role played by non-violent political affiliates in 
ending terrorist groups advances extant research by moving beyond the singular focus on the 
violent end that has dominated prior studies (Abrahms, 2011; Kydd and Walter, 2006; Nilsson, 
2018). Second, the current study also provides a foundation on which future research could build 
by exploring the intricate ways in which terrorist groups are embedded in larger political 
structures. Third, addressing this research question highlights the conditions under which 
negotiation serves as a viable counter-terrorism strategy. Notwithstanding the philosophical 
constraints of negotiation, should policymakers deploy strategies of negotiation judiciously, the 
result could be considerable savings in terms of money and lives that would likely be lost in 




I propose an analysis that builds from prevailing narratives of terrorist group longevity, 
including explanations that center on group size, target types, and breadth of goals across 112 
international terrorist groups. At the same time, I move beyond prior research by also 
investigating politicization – the process by which terrorist groups enter into a peace agreement 
or other cessation of hostilities with a governing entity. Broadly, I seek to explore the role of 
ancillary, non-violent political affiliates as a part of the politicization process, which speaks to 
the ways in which terrorist groups court (or fail to persuade) constituents at the local or regional 
levels in order to increase their bargaining power and leverage their popularity.  
         The project unfolds as follows. First, I draw on the terrorism literature to describe 
foundational patterns of terrorism globally. Second, I provide a brief overview of the theoretical 
underpinnings of my study rooted in organizational sociology/criminology, social movements 
research, and political science. Third, I survey the relevant literature with particular attention to 
the gaps in knowledge that remain unaddressed within empirical research. Fourth, I outline the 
parameters of the current study, including my hypotheses, data, analysis, and results. This 
includes particular attention to the existing secondary terrorism databases, including the End of 
Terror, Global Terrorism Database (GTD), and Non-Violent and Violent Campaign Outcomes 
(NAVCO), that form the centerpieces of the current project. Fifth, I elaborate upon the results of 
the quantitative analysis by providing a brief typology of terrorist groups relative to their 
politicization and non-violent political affiliation, using case studies as contextual examples of 
these processes. Finally, sixth, I conclude with a discussion of key findings relative to prior 






THE EMPIRICAL BOUNDARIES OF TERRORISM 
I begin the literature review with a brief overview of some of the recent criminological 
literature on terrorism, both within the United States context and abroad. This literature, like that 
of social movements and political science (discussed below), often investigates terrorism at the 
event level, including evaluating the effectiveness of the counterterrorism strategies that law 
enforcement agencies use. In general, criminologists find that certain law enforcement strategies 
adopted by U.S. officials, when applied in suitable circumstances, can be effective 
counterterrorism tools (Dahl, 2011). Recent research suggests that human intelligence (or 
information gathered from community members or other law-enforcement agencies) is vital to 
successful counterterrorism initiatives by law enforcement, especially when the terrorists are of 
far-right ideology (Dahl, 2011; Difo, 2010; Klein et. al, 2019). Other counterterror actions tend 
to be less effective: targeted killings or assassinations of major terrorist leaders, for example, do 
not seem to meaningfully change the overall frequency of terrorist attacks, at least not in the 
contexts of global jihadist terrorism and the Irish republican conflict (Carson, 2017; Gruenewald, 
2017; LaFree, Dugan, and Korte, 2009). Still others find that terrorist groups tend to commit 
attacks more frequently in areas that are characterized by high levels of social disorganization 
(LaFree and Bersani, 2014).  
Others find similar evidence when examining terrorist groups across the world. On the 
one hand, this research generally shows that counter-terror strategies can be effective measures 
for preventing terrorism when applied in the proper context. On the other hand, poorly managed 
counterterror actions may actually increase terrorist groups’ capacity and willingness to carry out 
attacks. LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009), for example, find that British counterterrorism 




Chenoweth (2012) argue that deterrence strategies that focus on punishments for committing 
terrorism tend to be less successful than strategies that reward terrorists for abstaining from 
violence. Recent research by Asal, Rethemeyer, Phillips, and Young (2018) notes that 
governments which use force against larger terrorist groups increase the likelihood of future 
terrorist attacks, whereas conciliatory counter-terrorism strategies tend to result in fewer attacks.  
More broadly, this growing body of interdisciplinary research that includes 
criminologists, political scientists, economists, and sociologists, explores the conditions under 
which terrorist groups end. While this area remains somewhat underdeveloped compared to other 
facets of terrorism research, recent studies yield important findings. For example, researchers 
note that the ecosystem of violent non-state actors where a terrorist group is active condition how 
and when terrorist groups end (Young and Dugan, 2014). They conclude that young terrorist 
groups tend to end more frequently than more established groups, that groups in more populous 
states tend to last longer, and that terrorist groups motivated by a religious ideology tend to be 
more durable than others (Blomberg et. al, 2010; Blomberg et. al, 2011). Additionally, Young 
and Dugan (2014) find that terrorist groups tend to survive longer in low-competition 
environments (in environments that have fewer rival terrorist groups) and that the terrorist group 
which is most active in a given environment is the most likely to endure. Taken as a whole, this 
prior research demonstrates the importance of organizational activity and environmental 
characteristics as they impact the ends of terrorist groups. 
THEORETICAL ORIENTATION 
Rational Choice Theory  
The present study focuses on the features that make terrorist groups more likely to 




agree to cease hostilities. That characteristics of organizations and their actions affect reception 
and reaction dovetails with theories of organization-structure, including open-systems theory, 
which is itself a variant of rational choice theory (Southerland and Potter, 1993). Pioneered in the 
late 18th century by Cesarre Beccaria, rational choice theory argues that individuals are logical 
and that they undergo some form of cost-benefit analysis in the decision-making process (Clarke 
and Cornish, 1986; Pratt 2008). The theory continues to enjoy widespread use, particularly in the 
fields of economics and criminology. Rational choice theory is perhaps best summarized by 
Ronald Clarke and Derrick Cornish in their observation that social behavior (in their case, crime) 
is “the result of broadly rationalized choices based on analyses of anticipated costs and benefits” 
(Clarke and Cornish, 1986, 6). Contemporary researchers have tested the theoretical groundwork 
laid first by these scholars across numerous quantitative studies of non-normative action with 
mixed results (Gul, 2009; Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1996; Wright et al., 2004). While some 
scholars find persuasive evidence of rational-decision making, at least in specific contexts such 
as cheating and white-collar crime, others hold that rational choice theory withers under careful 
empirical scrutiny (Gul, 2009; Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1986; Paternoster and Tibbets, 2016; 
Tibbets and Myers, 1999; Wright et al., 2004.)  
More specific to the current study, terrorism researchers often draw on rational-choice 
theory in their studies of terrorist activity (Abrahms, 2008; Crenshaw, 2017; Shughart, 2011). In 
particular, they argue that, while a terrorist organization’s goals and methods may not themselves 
be rational, their resource allocation schemes are often designed to maximize rewards with 
minimal costs and that they tend to respond to counter-terrorism initiatives by modifying their 




decisions may not be rational, the collective sum of the decisions made by terrorist organizations 
may be rational (Crenshaw, 2017). 
Open-Systems Theory    
In turn, those scholars working at larger aggregations within the sociology of 
organizations have subsumed key insights from the rational choice perspective, including within 
the study of terrorism. Much of this work coalesces under open-systems theory. Rather than 
treating organizations as self-contained entities (Bastedo, 2004), proponents of open-systems 
theory hold that organizations are affected by changes to their environments, including various 
social, economic, and political forces (Southerland and Potter, 1993). Organizations that adapt to 
environmental changes by modifying their behavior and/or organizational structures are more 
likely to survive and achieve their goals, whatever those goals may be (Abrahms, 2008; 
Southerland and Potter, 1993; Ullrich and Wieland, 1980). In contrast, those organizations with 
structural and behavioral models poorly suited to particular social, economic, and political 
environments wither and ultimately collapse (Mintzberg, 1979; Southerland and Potter, 1993; 
Thompson, 1967). In short, open-systems theorists analyze organizations according to their 
structures and activities in order to identify organizational configurations that are suited to 
specific locations and contexts (Cressey, 1972; Lampe, 2016; Schelling, 1971).  
Of particular relevance to the current study, a limited body of research establishes that 
terrorist organizations operate within this open-system framework, especially when considering 
how they begin, persist, and end. To be sure, until the 1990s, scholars and policymakers had, for 
the most part, failed to consider the ways in which terrorist groups met their ends (Crenshaw, 
1991). Martha Crenshaw’s groundbreaking (1991) analysis of the mechanisms that lead to the 




government action against a group) are not always the determinants of organizational outcomes. 
Instead, Crenshaw (1991) finds that, at least in some cases, terrorism defeats itself. Her insight, 
in keeping with open-systems theory, introduces to terrorism research the possibility that the 
behavior of terrorists and of their organizational structures impact how and when those terrorist 
groups disband. Such insights have been most notably built upon by Seth Jones and Martin 
Libicki (2008), as well as Audrey Cronin (2006), all of whom attempt to answer questions that 
were first introduced by Crenshaw regarding how different facets of terrorist organizations 
correlate with the longevity of those groups. I turn now to a brief review of the literature with a 
particular focus on empirical scholarship examining how terrorist groups end. 
REVIEW OF PRIOR LITERATURE 
         Research on the end of terrorist organizations can generally be divided into two areas. 
The first includes the work of researchers who suggest that the factors that lead terrorist groups 
to end are primarily environmental, regardless of organizational structure or actions taken. The 
second area of research tends to posit that the behavior and organizational structures of terrorist 
groups are directly linked to the manner in which they end. There exists some overlap between 
these subsections, as several of the researchers (e.g., Crenshaw [1991, 2011], Cronin [2006, 
2011], Jones and Libicki [2008], and Tompkins [2015]) tend to prefer behavioral to 
environmental explanations, but acknowledge that environmental factors (such as the response 
by a state to terrorism) influence how and when a terrorist group ends. 
Environmental Factors Condition Terrorist Longevity 
         Proponents of the first school of thought claim that environmental factors, or factors that 
are external to the terrorist group, are directly linked to the manner in which a terrorist group 




type of a given state, the counter-terrorism initiatives of a government, or even the physical 
landscape of an environment (Jones and Libicki, 2008; Kydd and Walter, 2006; Nilsson, 2018; 
Pape, 2006). Core to this strain of the larger terrorism literature is the supposition that terrorist 
groups will generally survive until they are acted upon by an external actor or social force 
(Berman and Latin, 2008; Kydd and Walter, 2006). Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter (2006) 
elaborate this school’s argument: terrorism is a form of “costly signaling” in which terrorists, 
who are too weak to impose their wills on state actors, communicate their resolve to achieve 
their goals by accepting and inflicting heavy costs in lives and resources (p. 50; see  also Berman 
and Laitin, 2008). They and other researchers propose a causal logic summarized as follows: 
terrorism succeeds when terrorists persuade a target audience to make concessions. 
This involves two countervailing processes. On the one hand, terrorists compel 
concessions when they demonstrate that they are capable of imposing heavy costs if their 
demands are not met. Berman and Laitin (2008) reinforce this premise, contending that terrorist 
violence consumes the resources of a target state. In this view, terrorists tend to be more 
successful when the population or governing body that they target lacks the resources necessary 
to defeat terrorism or when a governing entity or target population realizes that negotiating with 
or even, in rare cases, capitulating to the terrorist organization might be “cheaper” than entering 
a potentially protracted conflict. On the other hand, the specific response of the state to acts of 
terrorism also has an effect (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Cronin, 2011; Tompkins, 2015).  
Related research indicates that the extent and severity of a government or police 
department’s response to terrorism can either extinguish or, in some cases, galvanize support for 
the terrorist group among potential constituents (LaFree, Dugan, and Korte, 2009; Tompkins, 




might alienate citizens and increase the likelihood that it will need to grant concessions to the 
terrorist organization as compared to if a government responds with appropriate, precise force 
less likely to foster widespread discontent among non-combatants (Jones and Libicki, 2008; 
Thompkins, 2015).  
         Others argue that the political structure of the state is directly linked to its capacity to 
defeat terrorism (Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Wilkinson, 2006). The findings of the literature 
here are more mixed. While some scholars hold that democratic governments are uniquely 
equipped to defeat terrorist organizations, others argue that authoritarian governmental structures 
are better suited to quashing violence and political dissent when and where it arises (Eubank and 
Weinberg, 1994; Nilsson, 2018; Wilkinson 2006). Still others see the political structure of the 
state as a conditioning factor of the behavior of terrorist organizations. Pape (2006), for example, 
argues that terroristic suicide aims to coerce specifically democratic countries to render 
concessions, just as Nilsson (2018; see also Choi and Piazza, 2016; Wade and Reiter, 2007) finds 
that the political structure of the state influences the targets that terrorists choose to attack. Still 
others argue that the social conditions that prevail in a given context condition terrorism. Fahey 
and LaFree (2014) find evidence that terrorist groups tend to be more active in states in which 
there is a high degree of social disorganization. In summary, a sizeable literature emphasizes a 
milieu of external features – including the nature of state and governmental structures and 
responses to terrorism by them – that shape the life cycle of terrorist organizations, including 
how they ultimately end.  
Behavioral and Organizational Factors Condition Terrorist Longevity 
        In contrast to the perspective above, other scholars hold that a terrorist 




group ends. That is, the behavior and organizational features of the terrorist organizations 
themselves are the primary factors that shape the life cycles of those groups. Many of these 
analyses focus on the targets of terrorist organizations. For instance, Abrahms (2011) notes that 
terrorist organizations end because attacks on civilians cause policymakers to “dig in their 
political heels” and deprive terrorists of their “preferences” (Abrahms, 2011, 584). Still others, 
namely Jones and Libicki (2008), emphasize that a group’s size, the breadth of its goals (from 
broad to narrow), in addition to its preferred targets (either civilian or non-civilian), are directly 
related to the outcomes it will attain and, therefore, to the longevity of the group. Those terrorist 
organizations that are larger, with narrower goals, and which avoid attacking civilians are more 
likely to achieve victory and/or last longer; in contrast, smaller groups, with broader goals, that 
attack civilians are more likely to end via either policing or military intervention (Jones and 
Libicki, 2008). 
Critically, it is the behavior and structure of the terrorist organizations themselves that 
shape their life cycles as groups. Their size (Asal et al, 2018; Crenshaw 2010; Cronin 2011), 
target choices (Abrahms, 2011; Kydd and Walter, 2006), ideology (Bloomberg et al, 2011) 
expected goals (Jones and Libicki 2008) determine how a group ends. Indeed, Jones Libicki 
(2008) observe substantial variation in the last stages of terrorist life cycles: over 40 percent of 
such groups dissolve as a result of political incorporation (politicization), roughly 40 percent end 
because of policing, while victory in achieving terroristic goals accounts for only about 10 
percent of all organizational ends. Cronin (2009) reinforces Jones and Libicki’s (2008) research, 
finding that most terrorist groups end due to some combination of coercive counter-terror 
strategies and the mutual decision of terrorists and authorities to negotiate. Some researchers find 




conflicts, but terrorists very rarely achieve their goals (Fortna, 2015). Terrorists simultaneously 
decrease the likelihood that combatants will achieve durable peace agreements and increase the 
duration of conflict (Asal et al, 2018). 
 Others hypothesize that the popularity of the goals a group pursues are related to how 
and when that group will end. Cronin (2011) finds that certain goals, especially religious and 
ethnonationalist objectives, tend to be more popular than others and that groups which pursue 
these goals are more likely to be long-lasting and compel concessions from a target audience. 
Some scholars find that non-violent political groups are more than twice as likely to achieve their 
goals as are violent groups, reinforcing Abrahm’s contention that attacks on civilians tend to end 
terrorist groups (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Thompkins (2015), for example, finds that non-
violent political movements that host a radical wing are slightly more likely to achieve their 
goals than are purely violent political movements. 
Gaps in Knowledge 
While the literature reviewed above makes important strides in describing the lifecycle of 
terrorist organizations, including how they end, several important issues remain unresolved. To 
that end, I identify three gaps in the existing literature. First, no study to date has thoroughly 
explored the organizational features and behaviors that lead terrorist groups to politicize. The 
absence of research on this topic likely owes to the lack of data related to politicization. To my 
knowledge, only Jones and Libicki (2008) have developed a dataset that includes measurable 
behaviors related to political incorporation or engagement. This gap is critical because 
politicization is the most common process by which terrorist groups end (Jones and Libicki, 




enable policymakers to better anticipate and potentially exploit politicization opportunities when 
they arise. 
Second, no study has investigated the role that non-violent political affiliates (NVPAs) 
play within a broader terrorist organization. Rather, most of the prior literature on terrorism has 
focused on violent, as opposed to non-violent, terrorist activities. As a result, not only has 
research on politicization as an end to terrorism remained under-developed broadly as noted 
above, but scholarship devoted to untangling how terrorist groups leverage other organizations 
and political actors is specifically lacking. Yet, should NVPAs play an important role in the 
politicization process, they may be key to counter-terrorism policies that specifically focus on 
negotiation.  
Third, very little previous work has applied open-systems theory to the politicization 
process. Instead, much prior research focuses on the individual actions of specific terrorist actors 
rather than on incorporating the broader open-systems framework that encourages careful 
consideration for the structures and behaviors of the groups to which those individuals belong. 
Filling this gap is critical as applying open-systems theory in the context of terrorist 
politicization may enable researchers to explore the organizational features and behaviors that 
can explain terrorist negotiation, while encouraging governmental actors to better understand the 
circumstances under which terrorism ends (potentially non-violently through political means). 
This thesis attempts to bridge these gaps by identifying some of the organizational 
features, focusing in particular on the non-violent political affiliates of terrorist organizations that 
are linked to politicization. In short, the current study clarifies the politicization process by 
synthesizing existing secondary data to create a new, unique dataset for analysis into the 




systems perspective, which puts the focus on the internal and external structures and processes 
affecting when and how terrorist groups end.  
PARAMETERS OF THE CURRENT STUDY 
         Building on prior empirical research and theory, the current project aims to identify some 
of the organizational features and behaviors that lead a terrorist group to politicize, or to enter a 
negotiated settlement with the state or governing body. Specifically, my research question is as 
follows: how does non-violent political affiliation relate to politicization (negotiated end)?  
Data 
To answer this question, I draw from three existing databases, listed in Table 1 below 
(see also the appendix for more information on specific coding schemes in each database). First, 
I draw on Jones and Libicki’s (2008) “End of Terror” dataset, which provides information on 
group size, breadth of goals, and politicization for 648 terrorist organizations. Second, I use the 
Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.0 dataset to create designations 
for NVPAs. Third, I draw on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to determine a 
terrorist organization’s preferred target type. Because most of these datasets are derivatives of 
the GTD, the data that I use refer to terrorist groups from around the world for the period 
extending from 1970 through 2019. 
Table 1. Description of Secondary Data Sources 
Database Author(s) Key Variables Provided 
“End of Terror” Jones and Libicki (2008) 
Politicization (DV) 
Group Size (IV) 
Breadth of Goals (IV) 
Group Lifespan (IV) 
NAVCO 2.0 Chenoweth and Orion (2013) NVPA (IV) 





Unit of Analysis 
The current study’s unit of analysis is the individual terrorist organization. Here, I borrow 
the definition for terrorism used by Jones and Libicki (2008, 3): “terrorism involves the use of 
politically motivated violence against non-combatants to cause intimidation or fear among a 
target audience.” Similarly, terrorist groups are defined as: “a collection of individuals belonging 
to a non-state entity that uses terrorism to achieve its objectives” (Jones and Libicki 2008, 3). 
I select the organization as the unit of analysis for four reasons. First, organizations are 
commonly treated as the unit of analysis in studies of social movements, which generally aim to 
determine why certain social groups mobilize, how they garner resources, or clarify what 
happens after a group or movement mobilizes. Second, I am working within an open-systems 
theoretical framework. Open-systems theory is predicated on meso-level analysis. This 
framework is well-suited to analysis at the group level. It moves beyond consideration of how 
individual people may contribute to organizational outcomes and instead emphasizes the ways in 
which those individuals operate collectively. Third, because organizations are frequently treated 
as the unit of analysis in studies of international terrorism, there exists widely available data 
surrounding terrorist organizations.  Finally, fourth, the outcome of interest – politicization – 
involves multitudes of different actors that, alone, lack the authority to establish political 
outcomes. Instead, the study of politicization requires an organizational lens. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for the proposed study is politicization, which is coded 
dichotomously (1 = terrorist group politicized) and defined as a terrorist group entering a 
negotiated settlement with a governing authority and ceasing violence. Thus, every organization 




As indicated above, the definition of politicization draws heavily on the open-
systems/organizations perspective, while building directly on the work of Jones and Libicki 
(2008), Crenshaw (1991, 2011), and Cronin (2006, 2011). This definition treats politicization as 
a process of negotiation in which a terrorist organization rejects violence in exchange for legal 
political status and/or state-rendered concessions. In my dataset, I evaluate politicization in 
binary terms: each group I include is listed as either having politicized or as having not 
politicized. I determine whether a group has politicized using the “End of Terror Dataset,1” 
which lists the ways in which 648 terrorist groups ended (Jones and Libicki, 2008). If a group 
rejects violence after securing a settlement with a state, I classify that group as having 
politicized. The final dataset contains 200 terrorist groups. However, not all of the terrorist 
groups included in the set have ended. Because of this, the regression analyses performed in the 
present study draw on a sample of the 112 terrorist groups that have ended.   
Focal Independent Variable: Non-Violent Political Affiliates 
For the purposes of the current study, the focal independent variable is the presence of a 
non-violent political affiliate (NVPA), coded dichotomously (1 = NVPA present) and defined as 
the presence of ancillary organs or affiliates of terrorist organizations, including affiliated 
political parties or courts, that pursue political objectives through non-violent methods. This 
definition for NVPA derives from Chenoweth and Stephan (2011: 6), in which such affiliates 
pursue “a series of observable, continuous tactics in pursuit of a political objective.” 
 
 
                                                      






In order to practically identify NVPAs, I rely on the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. The creators of 
this database collected information on the political affiliates and allied institutions of over 2,718 
social movements and terrorist organizations (Chenoweth and Orion, 2013). If the NAVCO 
dataset lists a terrorist group as having either an affiliate political party or an affiliate court, I 
code that group as having an NVPA. Thus, an NVPA is coded as being present only if a relevant 
affiliate is listed by the NAVCO dataset. 
Additional Control Variables 
Drawing from prior research on terrorist organizations, I also include several important 
covariates of politicization specifically, or terrorist group longevity more broadly. These include 
the group size of the organization (categorical from 0 – 100; 100 – 1,000; and more than 1,000) 
as estimated in the “End of Terror” database; the breadth of goals for each terrorist organization, 
which is defined using Jones and Libicki’s (2008) designation of narrow goals (e.g., regime 
change, specific policy change) versus broad goals (e.g., establishment of an empire, social 
revolution, etc.); target type, which uses the definitions employed by START and is coded in my 
dataset as a ratio-level measure that corresponds to the proportion of a terrorist group’s targets 
that were civilian. More specifically, civilian targets include any attacks on non-combatants that 
are unaffiliated with the state (including facilities like airports, educational institutions, public 
transport, businesses, and private citizens/property). Non-civilian targets commonly include 
government officials, police, military personnel, infrastructure, other terrorist groups, or 
unknown targets. Finally, I also include a control for the number of years that the organization 







 Given the review of prior literature and operationalizations of my key variables, I also 
generate the following guiding hypotheses. 
● H1: A terrorist organization is more likely to politicize when it contains an NVPA. 
Non-violent political affiliates serve three crucial functions. First, the political affiliate 
contextualizes and legitimizes the terrorist group’s violent actions by crafting a narrative, 
distributing propaganda, and delivering the group’s message and mission to potential 
constituents. Second, the non-violent political affiliate is a prerequisite for diplomatic dialogue – 
the state cannot communicate with a group that lacks the institutional infrastructure to answer its 
calls. Third, the non-violent political affiliate provides civic and organizational connections in 
otherwise barren areas. Furthermore, by identifying opportunities to achieve goals through 
diplomacy, a NVPA simultaneously tempts the terrorist organization to politicize. 
● H2: Larger terrorist organizations are more likely to politicize than smaller 
terrorist organizations.  
A terrorist group’s constituents must believe that the group is capable of achieving its 
goals. Smaller groups tend to be more fragile (e.g., losing members has a larger impact on the 
overall stability of the group). Therefore, a larger group is more likely to be seen as a stable, 
capable arbiter of local affairs. Larger groups are also more likely to be perceived as having the 
military strength to defeat the police or the state. Furthermore, neither the terrorists nor the legal 
authorities will make concessions if they do not believe that they need to. If a terrorist group is 
very small, authorities may not believe that its threats are credible; the state and the police are 
unlikely to perceive any benefit in negotiating with a group that they believe they could defeat 




to develop NVPAs. As terrorist groups acquire more resources, they become more likely to 
invest some of these resources in political wings. 
● H3: Terrorist groups that pursue narrow goals are more likely to politicize than 
those that pursue broad goals.  
The terrorist organization’s goals must offer a plausible solution to the problems (or the 
grievance) that its constituents face on the ground. If a group’s goals are broad (i.e., establishing 
a transnational caliphate), the state is unlikely to grant the group a mutually acceptable 
settlement. In contrast, if an organization’s goals are narrow enough that authorities can 
plausibly grant it concessions, while simultaneously serving the desires of a community or 
movement, the odds of politicization increase. Additionally, some of the effect of goals on 
politicization may work in conjunction with NVPAs such that terrorist groups that contain 
NVPAs are also more likely to pursue narrow goals. Because NVPAs are more sensitive to 
opportunities for negotiation than is the militant wing on a terrorist organization, NVPAs are 
likely to advocate for narrow goals that authorities can plausibly acquiesce to. 
● H4: Terrorist groups that primarily attack non-civilian targets are more likely to 
politicize than those that mainly attack civilian targets.  
Per this last hypothesis, a terrorist group that mostly targets civilians risks ostracizing its 
constituents. In turn, this underminesthe economic support and recruitment efforts needed to 
sustain the political aspirations of a terrorist group, thereby undermining the peaceful, political 
activities necessary for politicization (and the NVPAs who might be helpful in attaining 
politicization). Terrorist groups that chiefly attack the state and others that its constituents 
consider legitimate targets are more likely to muster popular political support. In other words, I 






I begin by describing the sample of 112 terrorist organizations that have ended (i.e., are 
no longer active) and that are the focus of my analysis. These are displayed in Table 2. For the 
categorical variables, I present proportions/frequencies within each category, while means and 
standard deviations are presented for all continuous variables. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Sample of Terrorist Organizations (n = 112) 
          
Variable   % 
Mea
n Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variable:         
Politicization   27.7% - - 
          
Focal Independent Variable:         
Non-Violent Political Affiliate (NVPA)   33% - - 
          
Additional Control Variables:         
% Civilian Targets   - 55.3 31.8 
Group size: small a   51% - - 
Group size: medium   25% - - 
Group size: large   24% - - 
Breadth of Goals: Narrow   85% - - 
Longevity b   - 10.5 13.6 
          
a Serves as the reference category for multivariate analyses      
b Provided in the original metric here but is logged for subsequent multivariate 
analyses 
 I note five key findings. First, most terrorist groups do not politicize. In the sample of 112 
groups used in the present study’s regression analysis, only 27.7 percent of groups politicized. 
This indicates that, while politicization is not an especially rare outcome for terrorist groups, it is 
not the norm. Most terrorist groups end through mechanisms other than politicization. Second, 
most terrorist groups (67 percent) do not contain a non-violent political affiliate. Like 




Third, terrorist groups tend to be small. In the sample, 51 percent of groups contained 
fewer than 100 members. Twenty-five percent contained between 100 and 1,000 members, and 
only 24 percent contained over 1,000. Fourth, while the mean value for percent civilian targets 
(55.3 percent) suggests that terrorist groups target civilians about as often as they target non-
civilians, the high standard deviation (31.8) indicates that there exists a high degree of variation 
between targets. This suggests that terrorist groups differ greatly in their selection of targets with 
some groups primarily carrying out attacks on a single target type (including some that 
overwhelmingly target civilians), while others disperse attacks more evenly between civilians 
and non-civilians. Still others rarely attack civilians. Fifth, most terrorist groups tend to last two 
years or fewer (not shown), but the average for duration (10.5) is driven up by outliers that, in 
some cases, include groups have lasted more than 50 years. The standard deviation of longevity 
(13.6) is higher than the mean, indicating that there is a very high degree of variance that is 
largely attributable to the aforementioned outliers.    
Bivariate Analysis 
I turn next to an analysis designed to illustrate the one-to-one relationship between my 
key outcome – politicization – and each of my focal independent variables. Table 3 displays 
these results of chi-square tests for all categorical independent variables and binary logistic 
regressions for the continuous variables (percent civilian, longevity). My focus here is on how 






I note five key findings. First, most of the terrorist groups in the sample that politicized 
contained an NVPA (54 percent). Only 15 percent of groups politicized but did not contain an 
NVPA. The chi-square test yields a value of 19.2, which is statistically significant at the .001 
level, indicating that there exists an association between NVPA and politicization: those groups 
with a non-violent political affiliate are more likely to politicize. Second, the bivariate logit 
regression coefficient for percentage of civilian targets (-1.11) is not statistically significant at 
the .05 level. The percentage of group’s attacks on civilian targets is unrelated to politicization. 
Table 3. Bivariate Relationships Between Politicization and All Independent 
Variables (n = 112)  
       
  
Frequency Politicized 
(%) Test for Diff. 
 
       
Non-Violent Political Affiliate 
(NVPA)     
 
Yes 20  (54%)    
No 11  (15%) 
 19.20   p < 
.001 
 
Additional Control Variables:      
% Civilian Targets - 
-1.11     p > 
.05 
 
       
Group size: small 5  (16%)    
Group size: medium 10  (32)%    
Group size: large 16  (52%) 
 24.39   p < 
.001 
 
       
Breadth of Goals: Narrow 29  (94%)    
Breadth of Goals: Broad 2  (6%)  2.39     p > .05  
       
Longevity - 
 0.63     p < 
.001 
 
Note: The statistical significance of politicization differences for categorical 
variables (NVPA, Group Size, Breadth of Goals) are estimated using chi-square 
tests, while the relationship between continuous variables (Civilian Targets, 









Third, larger groups tend to politicize more often, as indicated by the frequency 
politicized column in Table 3. Groups containing more than 1000 members politicized more 
frequently that did groups of any other size, followed by those group between 100 and 1000, 
with smaller groups (less than 100 members) politicizing less frequently. The chi-square statistic 
here (24.39) is also significant at the .001 level, again suggesting a statistically significant 
association between group size and politicization.  Fourth, the chi-square value for breadth of 
goals (2.39), is not statistically significant at the traditional p<.05 level, indicating that breadth of 
goals is unrelated to the likelihood of politicization. This may be due to a lack of variation in the 
breadth of goals with most groups seeking more modest changes and, therefore, reducing the 
comparisons against groups with broader goals in terms of their politicization. Finally, the 
logistic regression coefficient for longevity (.63) is statistically significant at the .001 level, 
suggesting the existence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between longevity 
and politicization. As the number of years a terrorist group is active increases, the likelihood of 
politicization increases.  
Multivariate Models: Predicting Politicization 
While instructive, the bivariate relationships described above fail to consider important 
differences across terrorist groups that might simultaneously impact the likelihood of 
politicization (e.g., larger groups may be more likely to include a non-violent affiliate in ways 
that increase politicization generally). Thus, to address my primary research question – how does 
non-violent political affiliation impact the likelihood of politicization? – I focus now on building 
a series of multivariate models that predict politicization as a function of NVPA and other 
critical terrorist group characteristics that might affect also impact politicization or non-violent 




I present the models in two steps. The first model replicates Jones and Libicki’s (2008) 
study by including group size (medium and large categories), civilian target proportion, breadth 
of goals, and longevity. The second model includes the same variables with the addition of 
NVPA as the focal independent variable of the present study. 
Table 4. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Politicization Among Terrorist 




         
    Model 1 Model 2  
         
Non-Violent Political Affiliate (NVPA)   - 3.748*  
         
         
         
% Civilian Targets   0.406 0.243  
         
Group size: medium   4.229* 3.804  
         
Group size: large   10.042** 6.301*  
         
Breadth of Goals: Narrow   0.559 1.537  
         
Longevity (ln)   1.178 1.028  
         
         
Psuedo R2   0.177 0.245  
Model X2   27.42 33.04  
         
         
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
       
 
Model 1 reveals statistically significant, positive relationships between group size (both 
medium and large versus small) and politicization, such that both medium and large groups are 
more likely to politicize than are small groups (p<.05 and p<.01, respectively). In the sample, 
terrorist groups of medium size are over four times more likely to politicize than groups of small 




small groups. No other terrorist group characteristics are statistically significant in model 1. The 
R2 value for Model 1 is .177, indicating that just under 18 percent of the variation in 
politicization can be explained by accounting for civilian targets, group size, breadth of goals, 
and longevity of terrorist organizations.  
Model 2, which incorporates NVPA into the previous model, also finds statistically 
significant relationships between group size and politicization. However, unlike model 1, the 
second model does not yield a statistically significant odds ratio for the medium group size, and 
the odds ratio for the large group size decreased from 10.042 to 6.301 (and the statistical 
significance declines to p<.05). That is, large groups are over six times more likely to politicize 
than small groups, net of other key group characteristics and the presence of non-violent political 
affiliates. Most importantly, model 2 also reveals a statistically significant relationship between 
NVPA and politicization (p<.05). The odds ratio is 3.748, indicating that terrorist groups that 
contain an NVPA are almost four times more likely to politicize than groups that do not contain 
an NVPA, net of other important terrorist group characteristics. The model R2 value also 
increased from .177 (model 1) to .245 (model 2), indicating that the model explains an additional 
7 percent of the variation in politicization with the inclusion of non-violent political affiliation 
(this is confirmed by chi-square model fit statistics). 
Overall then, the current study finds strong evidence of a relationship between NVPAs 
and politicization, as well as group size and politicization. Table 2 yields insight as to what the 
average group in the sample looks like – the typical terrorist organization did not contain an 
NVPA, did not politicize, targeted mostly civilians, contained 100 or fewer members, and lasted 
for about 10 years (though this value is driven up significantly by outliers). The bivariate 




multivariate statistics reveal that NVPA and the large group size share a statistically significant 
relationship with politicization, indicating that these two IVs as especially important to the 
politicization process.     
A TYPOLOGY OF TERRORIST GROUP ENDS: NVPA AND POLITICIZATION 
To illustrate the lifecycle relationship between NVPA and politicization described in my 
quantitative models above, as well as how different environmental and organizational conditions 
might contribute to the politicization process, I create below a typology of the terrorist 
organizations included in this dataset. This is illustrated in Table 5. This typology contains four 
categories with the overall goal of providing specific examples of the ways that terrorist 
organizations do (and do not) engage non-violent political affiliates and do (and do not) 
politicize as a means of ending. The first cell includes terrorist groups that contained an NVPA 
and politicized, a condition met by 23 groups (16.5 percent of all groups that officially ended at 
the time of this study). The second type includes terrorist groups that contained an NVPA but did 
not politicize, criteria shared by 19 groups (13.7 percent of all groups examined). The third type 
includes groups that did not have an NVPA but did politicize. This cross-classification contains 
only 14 groups, making it the least common scenario in this data (10.1 percent of all groups 
examined). The final type includes terrorist groups that did not have an NVPA and did not 
politicize. This is by far the most common scenario, present for 83 groups (59.7 percent of all 
groups examined).  In the pages that follow, I briefly describe the organizational features and 








Type One: Groups That Contained an NVPA and Politicized 
 The Irish Republican Army (IRA) (active as a terrorist organization from 1969 to 2005) 
waged a near 30-year violent campaign to end British rule of Ireland and establish a reunified 
Irish republic. The organization carried out attacks in Northern Ireland, as well as in England, on 
both civilian and government targets. The IRA grew out of a non-violent political group bearing 
the same name and continued to enjoy the original IRA’s political affiliates despite being 
officially independent from them. Chief among these NVPAs was Sinn Fein, an Irish political 
party that shared the IRA’s objectives. After a years-long (and largely unsuccessful) campaign 
by the IRA to establish an independent, unified Irish state, Sinn Fein entered negotiations with 
English officials in 1997 that would ultimately lead the organization to abandon violence for 
political representation in a reformed government. Drawing on the themes of my quantitative 
analysis, the IRA may have been able to politicize for four reasons. First, the organization’s 
NVPA, Sinn Fein, established the conditions that enabled the IRA to negotiate, making 
politicization possible. The IRA also mostly refrained from attacking civilians (60 percent of its 
attacks were against non-civilian targets), which may have helped it win popular support. Third, 
the IRA pursued narrow, achievable goals, which made negotiation with English officials 
Table 5. Typologies of Terrorist Groups by NVPA and Politicization   
  
Contained an NVPA and Politicized 
 N=20 (17.9%) 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
Mozambique National Resistance 
Movement (RENAMO) 
Contained an NVPA, Did Not Politicize  
N=17(15.2%) 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 
Khmer Rouge 
Did Not Contain NVPA, and 
Politicized N=11(9.8.%) 
Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) 
Self-Defense Groups of Cordoba 
and Uraba (ACCU) 
Did Not Contain an NVPA, Did Not 
Politicize  
N=68(57.1%) 





tenable. Fourth, the organization was sufficiently large that the English government saw its 
threats as credible.  
 Similarly, the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) also exemplifies 
this organizational type. RENAMO, a right-wing opposition movement, was founded in 1976 in 
a bid to overturn leadership of Mozambique by a Marxist political party (FRELIMO). Despite 
targeting mostly civilians (63 percent of attacks), RENAMO maintained several NVPAs both in 
the territories it controlled and abroad. In 1992, after a nearly 15-year terrorist campaign that had 
resulted in civil war, FRELIMO and RENAMO, through non-violent affiliates, reached a peace 
agreement that granted RENAMO legitimate political status in exchange for agreeing to abandon 
violence. The ability of RENAMO to achieve politicization may rest on three characteristics of 
its organization and activities. First, and perhaps most importantly, RENAMO used several 
NVPAs that helped initiate negotiations with FRELIMO. Second, the organization pursued a 
relatively narrow objective in the form of regime change. Third, RENAMO contained over 1,000 
members at its peak, making it a large enough group that opposition may have been forced to 
take it seriously. 
Taken together, both the IRA and RENAMO are examples of what my own quantitative 
analysis finds to be an important process. That is, terrorist groups that engage non-violent 
political affiliates leverage them strategically to end through politicization. Indeed, the two 
examples illustrate that other features still matter (including groups size and the breadth of 
goals), even when some factors (e.g., civilian targets) differ more prominently. 
Type Two: Groups That Contained an NVPA, but Did Not Politicize 
 The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) launched a three-year campaign of 




which targeted civilians in nearly 70 percent of cases, catalyzed the Liberian Civil War, which 
lasted until 1996. Despite its large membership (estimates place its membership at over 1,000) 
and a host of NVPAs established mainly in the territory the group conquered, the NPFL did not 
politicize. This may owe to the fact that the group usually attacked civilians, often committing 
massacres and using torture in ways that alienated Liberian civilians. In turn, the Liberian 
government was less willing to negotiate with NFPL leadership and the group ended in 1995 
when it defeated the government across most of Liberia and achieved victory. 
 As another example of this type, the Khmer Rouge began its terrorist activities in 1951. 
Initially doubling as a Cambodian communist guerilla movement and political party, the Khmer 
Rouge had an NVPA from its founding. The organization overthrew the Cambodian government 
in 1975 and became the ruling party of Cambodia. As Cambodia’s governing faction, the Khmer 
Rouge continued to use terrorism to maintain control of the country. The organization’s attacks 
targeted civilians in 72 percent of cases according to the Global Terrorism Database, which may 
have alienated the Cambodian public and international spectators. The Khmer Rouge were 
expelled from Cambodia after a Vietnamese invasion of the country in 1979, which caused the 
organization to rapidly lose power and support. After a protracted period of decline, the 
organization ceased its terrorist activities in 1998 without ever politicizing. Like the NFPL, the 
Khmer Rouge was a large organization with a built-in NVPAs (including most of the Cambodian 
government itself from 1975-1979. 
 The cases of the NPFL and the Khmer Rouge exemplify some of the means by which 
terrorist groups might fail to politicize even when NVPAs are present. For the NPFL, 
politicization may not have occurred because the NPFL did not have to negotiate. The group did 




unnecessary. Similarly, the Khmer Rouge may not have used NVPAs during its early years 
because it did not need them to gain control of most of Cambodia, at least temporarily. Both the 
NPFL and the Khmer Rouge were large enough to gain control of their respective countries as 
well as very willing to engage in brutal attacks on civilians, highlighting group size and target 
type as potentially important characteristics of terrorist groups that contained NVPAs, but did not 
politicize.    
Type Three: Groups That Did Not Contain an NVPA, but Politicized 
 Northern Ireland’s Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) emerged in 1996 in response to 
attacks by the IRA and related Irish republican groups. The LVF aimed to thwart Irish 
republicanism and to undermine the IRA’s efforts to unify Ireland and Northern Ireland. Unlike 
the IRA, the LVF did not have NVPAs and did not exercise restraint in its target selection. The 
LVF targeted civilians in nearly 90 percent of its attacks (who were disproportionately Catholic). 
The LVF began to commit attacks less frequently in the months following the IRA’s 
politicization. The LVF managed to similarly politicize in spite of its relatively modest size 
(between 100 and 1,000 members ), its propensity to target civilians, and its lack of NVPAs 
because the organization agreed to a ceasefire following the Good Friday Agreement. The 
organization also pursued relatively narrow goals, which may have made mutually acceptable 
negotiation with the authorities more possible. Most importantly, the opportunity for negotiation 
opened by IRA affiliates enabled the LVF to enter a ceasefire agreement in spite of its civilian 
targets, modest size, and lack of NVPAs.  
  The Self-Defense Groups of Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU) was a Colombian terrorist 
organization formed in 1994 in response to frequent kidnappings carried out by left-wing guerilla 




of territory, the ACCU often collaborated with Colombian drug traffickers and carried out 
attacks on left-wing activists. The group contained over 1,000 members at the height of its power 
and selected civilian targets in 69 percent of its attacks. While ACCU did not have NVPAs, its 
predecessor organization had collaborated with Colombian police to track down and ultimately 
kill Pablo Escobar. The ACCU formally politicized and came to an end in 2006 after negotiating 
a peace agreement with the Columbian government. Key for my purposes, the ACCU may have 
managed to politicize for three reasons. First, it was composed of a large and powerful network 
of paramilitary groups, many of which were deeply tied to Columbian drug traffickers, 
presenting a substantial threat to the Colombian government. Second, ACCU members had 
opened diplomatic channels with the Colombian government when they collaborated with police 
to kill Pablo Escobar, which may have offset the group’s lack of NVPAs. Third, the organization 
pursued a relatively modest goal (protecting rural regions of the country that were tied to the 
Colombian drug trade), which made negotiation with the Colombian government tenable. 
The LVF and the ACCU present interesting cases for the purposes of this analysis. 
Despite the fact that neither group contained a NVPA, they both politicized. Moreover, while the 
ACCU was a large organization, the LVF only contained between 100 and 1,000 members, 
indicating that a large group size is not a prerequisite to politicization. The two groups share a set 
of relatively narrow goals, as well as external circumstances that may have offset the absence of 
an NVPA. For the LVF, the Good Friday Agreement may have provided access to the 
negotiation that would otherwise have never materialized. Similarly, the ACCU had previously 
collaborated with authorities, which may have enabled leadership to open communication with 





Type Four: Groups That Did Not Contain an NVPA and Did Not Politicize 
 The Andres Castro United Front (FUAC) was a Nicaraguan terrorist organization that 
was active from 1995 to 2002. One among many Marxist guerilla organizations active in 
Nicaragua at the time, FUAC aimed to improve the living conditions of residents of the country’s 
poorest regions. FUAC was of medium size, containing over 100 members at its peak. The group 
targeted non-civilians in the vast majority of its attacks (75 percent). Despite the organization’s 
relative restraint in its target selection and moderate size, FUAC did not politicize. Relative to 
my own study, the group lacked an NVPA and remained relatively small. When the Nicaraguan 
government did attempt to initiate peace talks with the FUAC, the organization kidnapped 
negotiators and peace talks were subsequently discontinued. Following years of targeted 
assassinations of FUAC leaders by the Nicaraguan government after the failed peace talks, 
FUAC eventually disintegrated in 2002.  
 Aum Shinrikyo was a multiregional terrorist organization that was active from 1984-
2000. Initially a Japanese spiritual movement or religious organization, Aum Shinrikyo 
expanded quickly, spanning seven countries and containing over 10,000 members at its peak. 
Members began to carry out terrorist attacks in the late 1980s, mainly targeting civilians. The 
group attempted to manufacture chemical weapons through the early 1990s, which culminated in 
a sarin gas attack on a Tokyo subway in 1995. Following the attack, the Tokyo police launched 
an aggressive policing campaign that resulted in the arrest of much of the organization’s 
leadership. The group had largely abandoned terrorist activities by the end of 2000. Aum 
Shinrikyo likely failed to politicize for three reasons. First, the organization’s goals were 
extremely broad in trying to initiate Armageddon through its chemical weapons attacks. This 




Second, Aum Shinrikyo targeted civilians in over 60 percent of its attacks, which made them 
unpopular among Japanese civilians and left the Japanese government with little incentive for 
negotiation. Third, and central to my own analysis, Aum Shinrikyo did not have any NVPAs and 
lacked the institutional infrastructure through which authorities could have initiated negotiations. 
The two groups differ significantly across the independent variables that are identified as 
important in this analysis. Whereas Aum Shinrikyo was a massive group that pursued broad 
goals and frequently targeted civilians, the FUAC was a medium-sized group that pursued 
narrow goals and mainly targeted non-civilians. For this analysis, that the groups both lack an 
NVPA is key to understanding their inability to politicize: while the two organizations vary 
significantly in terms of other key variables, the lack of an NVPA may be the common factor 
that prevented either from politicizing.  
DISCUSSION 
  
 Terrorism remains a top foreign policy concern in the United States (Pew Research 
Center, 2016), an unsurprising observation given the specific resonance of the September 11th 
and other recent attacks, as well as the tripling of deaths related to terrorist attacks internationally 
since 2001 (GTD, 2020). In turn, terrorism research has grown tremendously (Freilich, 
Grunewald, and Mandala, 2019), both domestically and abroad, including scholarship devoted to 
understanding when and under what conditions terrorist groups end. Much of this recent 
literature has focused on the environmental conditions, most notably counter-terror initiatives by 
authorities, that lead terrorist groups to end. Yet, no study to date has explored the role of 
politicization as a key mechanism by which hostilities may cease, particularly as the structure of 
terrorist organizations and the decisions that terrorist groups make might shape the politicization 




study sought to highlight the importance of organizational structure and behavior within the 
terrorist lifecycle. My own analysis identified two key features of the politicization process: 
group size and the presence of a non-violent political affiliate (NVPA). In so doing, the current 
study sought to extend current research by introducing the possibility that novel organizational 
structures and terrorist political affiliates contribute significantly to the way in which terrorist 
organizations end.  
I noted six key findings. First, both politicization and non-violent political affiliation 
were found to be uncommon. For example, politicization – the negotiated end of a group through 
a peace agreement or other cessation of hostilities with a governing entity – was observed for 
only about a third of all groups. Instead, the majority of terrorist organizations ended through 
other means (e.g., policing, military force, victory). Likewise, non-violent political affiliates 
were also found to be somewhat uncommon: only about a third of all terrorist groups affiliated 
with a non-violent political party or organization. 
Second, most terrorist organizations were small and attacked a diverse array of targets. 
Over half of all groups had fewer than one hundred members, while targets were civilians more 
than fifty percent of the time for the typical terrorist organization (though with substantial 
variability across groups). Meanwhile, the average group lasted just over a decade. 
Third, and central to my specific research question, multivariate logistic regression 
models revealed that NVPAs play a crucial role in the politicization process. Specifically, 
terrorist organizations with a non-violent political affiliate were substantially and significantly 
more likely to politicize, other organization and behavioral covariates held constant. This finding 
moves forward the current literature by identifying a vital indicator of politicization that, to this 




corroborates the more suppositional conclusions of prior research that emphasize the end of 
terrorism and violent social campaigns through negotiation and politics (Cronin, 2009; 
Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Thompkins, 2015). 
Fourth, other factors were also found to impact the likelihood of politicization. In 
particular, larger groups (especially those containing over 1,000 members) appeared to be much 
more likely to politicize than smaller groups. This conclusion supports that of prior researchers 
who argue that terrorists tend to be more successful when they are capable of inflicting heavy 
costs on their targets (Kydd and Walter, 2006; Berman and Laitin, 2008). Here, politicization can 
be understood as the recourse of states who are unable to defeat terrorism through policing or 
military strategies as a function of terrorist group recruitment and membership reflected by larger 
groups. 
Yet, fifth, I did not find evidence that the targets a terrorist organization chose to pursue 
were related to politicization. While this conclusion does not suggest that targeting civilians is a 
successful strategy relative to other tactics, it does indicate that the targeting of civilians does not 
necessarily affect the possibility of successful negotiation once other factors are taken into 
account. This finding is somewhat at odds with Abrahm’s (2011) contention that the targeting of 
civilians discourages authorities from making concessions. In the present study, terrorists who 
targeted civilians were not found to be significantly less likely to politicize net of NVPA and 
other factors. At the same time, it was beyond the scope of the current study to examine whether 
terrorism is a more successful strategy than other tactics that do not involve attacks, including on 
civilians (such as peaceful protest). Instead, the conclusion here cannot adjudicate the notion that 




Stephan, 2011; Thompkins, 2015), though my findings also suggest that other factors may offset 
the target selection of these groups. 
Similarly, sixth, I found that the nature of the goals a terrorist organization chose to 
pursue, be they narrow or broad, were unrelated to politicization. This is not to say a group’s 
goals do not affect the manner in which it will end, but it does suggest that other organizational 
features are more important to the politicization process. As such, this conclusion does not 
necessarily contradict Jones and Libicki’s (2008) finding that terrorist groups that pursue 
narrower goals are more likely to achieve victory as politicization is a distinct outcome. 
Revisiting the Typologies: Exceptions to the NVPA-Politicization Link 
 These findings were further clarified by disaggregating terrorist groups into a typology of 
NVPA and politicization in order to illustrate specific instances (or not) of non-violent affiliation 
and politicization. It demonstrates, for example, that while NVPAs can be crucial to the 
politicization process, an NVPA does not guarantee politicization. The typology revealed that 
while the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Mozambique National Resistance Movement 
(RENAMO) leaned heavily on their NVPAs in order to start negotiations, the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Khmer Rouge did not need to negotiate using their own NVPAs as 
they were strong enough to achieve victory (though temporary in the case of the Khmer Rouge). 
Moreover, of the four groups listed above, only the IRA refrained from targeting civilians in 
most of its attacks. This suggests that groups that are powerful enough to achieve victory might 
have a greater propensity to attack civilians. The discrepancy in terms of outcome between these 
two scenarios indicates that, while NVPAs can facilitate negotiation, some groups that are 




goals without needing to compromise. This, in turn, suggests that larger terrorist organizations 
might favor strategies of victory rather than politicization.  
 Other groups managed to politicize without the help of an NVPA, suggesting that an 
NVPA is not a prerequisite to negotiation either. For example, the Loyalist Volunteer Force 
(LVF) and Self-Defense Groups of Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU) both managed to enter dialogue 
with authorities despite lacking non-violent affiliates. The ACCU and the LVF resembled 
RENAMO in terms of their targets, size, and goals, but they lacked an NVPA. For these groups, 
diplomatic channels were opened by other means. In the case of the LVF, the Good Friday 
Agreement, secured in part by the IRA’s NVPAs, enabled the group to seek reconciliation with 
authorities. In the case of the ACCU, the group had previously cooperated with authorities and 
likely retained access to government contacts. These observations also mean that, although 
NVPAs often create opportunities for negotiation, there exist other methods of initiating the 
peace process. That both the LVF and the ACCU targeted mostly civilians reinforces the 
quantitative finding that target type is unrelated to politicization. 
The final scenario included in the case study, groups that did not contain an NVPA and 
did not politicize, further reinforces the notion that NVPAs are vital to the politicization process 
by illustrating those organizations that neither engaged affiliates nor peacefully negotiated their 
ends. For instance, even when groups pursue relatively narrow goals and avoid attacks on 
civilians (as was the case for the Andres Castro United Front), the lack of an NVPA can still 
undermine the potential for negotiation. Interestingly, of the eight groups included in the case 
study, only one (Aum Shinrikyo) pursued broad goals. While it is difficult to observe patterns 
related to breadth of goals due to the rarity of broad goals, the case of Aum Shinrikyo indicates 




Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 The current study makes several important contributions to the terrorism literature, but 
there remain at least three ways to extend this line of inquiry. First, the total sample size for the 
study is small, with only 112 international terrorist groups included in the final regression 
analysis. While studies of terrorist groups frequently rely on relatively small samples, the current 
study would generate more robust findings were the sample larger. This small sample owes 
mainly to the lack of data surrounding NVPAs and politicization, which require detailed studies 
of the organizations and their histories to construct. Future studies might benefit from drawing 
on alternative data that can be used as a proxy for NVPA. 
Second, the current study lacks diversity for the measurement of breadth of goals. Only 
14 of the 112 total groups pursued broad goals, which makes it difficult to assess the effect of 
broad goals on politicization. Researchers who seek to continue investigating the politicization 
process may wish to identify and include more groups that pursued broad goals or to delineate 
organizational objectives with more variability. 
Third, the relationship between NVPAs and politicization is undermined by a potential 
issue with time. While the regression analysis offers evidence of a relationship between NVPAs 
and politicization, it is not clear whether the NVPA precedes the politicization process. It is 
possible, for example, that NVPAs often develop during politicization rather than being the 
catalysts of it. Future researchers might offset this problem if they can identify the time frame in 
which the terrorist developed an NVPA relative to when negotiations with authorities began. 
Alternatively, using time series methodology and lagged predictors might similarly provide 




 The present study offers two important insights for policymakers. First, negotiation with 
terrorists is a relatively common and often successful strategy for ending terrorist campaigns. 
There may exist a political cost to negotiating with terrorists, but politicization offers an 
opportunity for authorities to end terrorism peacefully. While philosophical and political costs to 
negotiation will remain a concern, the negotiated ends of terrorist organizations constitute viable 
routes for stakeholders to take.  
Second, negotiations are more likely to be successful when a terrorist organization is 
large and contains an NVPA. These two variables constitute valuable indicators that successful 
negotiation with a terrorist group is possible and should be considered by policymakers who are 
contemplating strategies involving negotiation. Policymakers might more comfortably assume 
the risk of negotiating with terrorists when these conditions are met, as the potential 
philosophical/political costs of negotiating with terrorists are offset by the possibility of 
negotiating a peaceful end to the violence. 
The current study has explored the process of politicization, an important dimension of 
the scholarship on the end of terrorism that has heretofore gone underdiscussed. While the 
present study offers a starting point for researchers who are interested in the politicization 
process, there remains a great need for additional research into the conditions under which 
terrorist groups end peacefully, including through their political and organizational strategies. 
Should future researchers continue this investigation, they will enrich our understanding of the 
terrorist lifecycle and, in so doing, arm policymakers with the information they need to combat 









Abrahms, Max. 2008. “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism 
Strategy.” International Security 32(4):78–105. doi: 10.1162/isec.2008.32.4.78. 
 
Abrahms, Max. 2011. “Does Terrorism Really Work? Evolution in the Conventional Wisdom 
since 9/11.” Defence and Peace Economics 22(6):583–94. doi: 
10.1080/10242694.2011.635954. 
 
Asal, Victor, Brian J. Phillips, R. Karl Rethemeyer, Corina Simonelli, and Joseph K. Young. 
2019. “Carrots, Sticks, and Insurgent Targeting of Civilians.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
63(7):1710–35. doi: 10.1177/0022002718789748. 
 
Bastedo, Michael. 2004. “Open Systems Theory.” The SAGE Encyclopedia of Educational 
Leadership and Administration. 
 
Belasco, Amy, Mackenzie Eaglen, Luke Hartig, Tina Jonas, Mike McCord, and John Mueller. 
2018. Counterterrorism Spending: Protecting America While Promoting Efficiencies and 
Accountabilities. Stimson Center. 
 
Berman, Eli, and David D. Laitin. 2008. “Religion, Terrorism, and Public Goods: Testing the 
Club Model.” Journal of Public Economics 92(10–11):1942–67. 
 
Blomberg, Brock, Rozlyn C. Engel, and Reid Sawyer. 2010. “On the Duration and Sustainability 
of Transnational Terrorist Organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54(2):303–30. 
doi: 10.1177/0022002709355431. 
 
Blomberg, S. Brock, Khusrav Gaibulloev, and Todd Sandler. 2011. “Terrorist Group Survival: 
Ideology, Tactics, and Base of Operations.” Public Choice 149(3–4):441–63. doi: 
10.1007/s11127-011-9837-4. 
 
Carson, Jennifer Varriale. 2017. “Assessing the Effectiveness of High-Profile Targeted Killings 
in the ‘War on Terror’: A Quasi-Experiment.” Criminology & Public Policy 16(1):191–220. 
doi: 10.1111/1745-9133.12274. 
 
Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic 
of Nonviolent Conflilct. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Choi, Seung-Whan, and James A. Piazza. 2016. “Ethnic Groups, Political Exclusion, and 
Domestic Terrorism.” Defence and Peace Economics 27(1):37–63. doi: 
10.1080/10242694.2014.987579. 
 
Cornish, Derek B., and Ronald V. Clarke, eds. 1986. The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice 





Crenshaw, Martha. 1981. “The Causes of Terrorism.” Comparative Politics 13(4):379. doi: 
10.2307/421717. 
 
Crenshaw, Martha. 1991. “How Terrorism Declines.” Terrorism and Political Violence 3(1):69–
87. doi: 10.1080/09546559108427093. 
 
Crenshaw, Martha. 2011. Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes, and Consequences. London; 
New York: Routledge. 
 
Crenshaw, Martha. 2017. “The Strategic Logic of Terrorism.” Pp. 448–61 in Conflict After the 
Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace. New York: Routledge. 
 
Cressey, Donald. 1972. Criminal Organization: Its Elementary Forms. New York City, NY: 
Harper and Row Publisher. 
 
Cronin, Audrey. 2006. “How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups.” 
International Security 31(1):7–48. doi: 10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.7. 
 
Cronin, Audrey. 2011. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Demise and Decline of 
Terrorist Campaigns. 1. paperback print. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. 
 
Dahl, Erik J. 2011. “The Plots That Failed: Intelligence Lessons Learned from Unsuccessful 
Terrorist Attacks Against the United States.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34(8):621–48. 
doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2011.582628. 
 
Difo, Germain. 2010. Ordinary Measures, Extraordinary Results: An Assessment of Foiled Plots 
Since 9/11. Washington, DC: American Security Project. 
 
Dugan, Laura, and Erica Chenoweth. 2012. “Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of 
Raising the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel.” American 
Sociological Review 77(4):597–624. doi: 10.1177/0003122412450573. 
 
Erica Chenoweth, and Lewis Orion. 2013. “Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes 
Dataset, v. 2.0.” 
 
Eubank, William Lee, and Leonard Weinberg. 1994. “Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 6(4):417–35. doi: 10.1080/09546559408427271. 
 
Fahey, Susan, and Gary LaFree. 2015. “Does Country-Level Social Disorganization Increase 
Terrorist Attacks?” Terrorism and Political Violence 27(1):81–111. doi: 
10.1080/09546553.2014.972156. 
 
FitzGerald, Valpy. 2004. “Global Financial Information, Compliance Incentives and Terrorist 






Fortna, Virginia Page. 2015. “Do Terrorists Win? Rebels’ Use of Terrorism and Civil War 
Outcomes.” International Organization 69(3):519–56. doi: 10.1017/S0020818315000089. 
 
Freilich, Joshua D., Jeff Gruenewald, and Marissa Mandala. 2019. “Situational Crime Prevention 
and Terrorism: An Assessment of 10 Years of Research.” Criminal Justice Policy Review 
30(9):1283–1311. doi: 10.1177/0887403418805142. 
 
Gruenewald, Jeff. 2017. “Do Targeted Killings Increase or Decrease Terrorism?: Evaluating the 
Evidence and Other Considerations.” Criminology & Public Policy 16(1):187–90. doi: 
10.1111/1745-9133.12275. 
 
Gruenewald, Jeff, Grant Drawve, and Brent L. Smith. 2019. “The Situated Contexts of American 
Terrorism: A Conjunctive Analysis of Case Configurations.” Criminal Justice and Behavior 
46(6):884–901. doi: 10.1177/0093854819842900. 
 
Gul, Serdar. 2009. “An Evaluation of the Rational Choice Theory in Criminology.” Journal of 
Sociology and Applied Science 4(8):36–44. 
 
Hedstrom, P., and R. Swedberg. 1996. “Rational Choice, Empirical Research, and the 
Sociological Tradition.” European Sociological Review 12(2):127–46. doi: 
10.1093/oxfordjournals.esr.a018181. 
 
Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. 2008. How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering 
Al Qa’ida. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. 
 
Klein, Brent R., Jeff Gruenewald, Steven M. Chermak, and Joshua D. Freilich. 2019. “A Mixed 
Method Examination of Law Enforcement Investigatory Strategies Used in Jihadi and Far-
Right Foiled Terrorist Plots Before and After 9/11.” Journal of Qualitative Criminal Justice 
& Criminology. doi: 10.21428/88de04a1.5963ad76. 
 
Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter. 2006. “The Strategies of Terrorism.” International 
Security 31(1):49–80. 
 
LaFree, Gary, and Bianca E. Bersani. 2014. “County-Level Correlates of Terrorist Attacks in the 
United States: Correlates of Terrorist Attacks in the U.S.” Criminology & Public Policy 
13(3):455–81. doi: 10.1111/1745-9133.12092. 
 
LaFree, Gary, and Laura Dugan. 2007. “Global Terrorism Database.” 
 
LaFree, Gary, Laura Dugan, and Raven Korte. 2009. “The Impact of British Counterterrorist 
Strategies on Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash 
Models.” Criminology 47(1):17–45. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-9125.2009.00138.x. 
 
Lampe, Klaus von. 2016. Organized Crime: Analyzing Illegal Activities, Criminal Structures and 





Mintzberg, Henry. 1979. The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of the Research. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Newman, Edward. 2006. “Exploring the ‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 29(8):749–72. doi: 10.1080/10576100600704069. 
 
Nilsson, Marco. 2018. “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism: Does Regime Type Affect the Choice 
of Targets.” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 10(2):176–85. doi: 
10.1080/19434472.2017.1367707. 
 
Onat, Ismail, and Zakir Gul. 2018. “Terrorism Risk Forecasting by Ideology.” European Journal 
on Criminal Policy and Research 24(4):433–49. doi: 10.1007/s10610-017-9368-8. 
 
Pape, Robert Anthony. 2006. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Random 
House Trade Paperback ed. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks. 
 
Paternoster, Ray, and Stephen G. Tibbetts. 2016. White-Collar Crime and Perceptual 
Deterrence. edited by S. R. Van Slyke, M. L. Benson, and F. T. Cullen. Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Pew Research Center. 2016. Top Voting Issues In 2016 Election. 
 
Pratt, Travis C. 2008. “Rational Choice Theory, Crime Control Policy, and Criminological 
Relevance.” Criminology & Public Policy 7(1):43–52. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-
9133.2008.00489.x. 
 
Rushchenko, Julia. 2019. “Terrorist Recruitment and Prison Radicalization: Assessing the UK 
Experiment of ‘Separation Centres.’” European Journal of Criminology 16(3):295–314. 
doi: 10.1177/1477370819828946. 
 
Schelling, Thomas C. 1971. “Dynamic Models of Segregation.” The Journal of Mathematical 
Sociology 1(2):143–86. doi: 10.1080/0022250X.1971.9989794. 
 
Shughart, William. 2011. “Terrorism in Rational Choice Perspective.” in The Handbook on the 
Political Economy of War. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Southerland, Mittie D., and Gary W. Potter. 1993. “Applying Organization Theory to Organized 
Crime.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 9(3):251–67. doi: 
10.1177/104398629300900306. 
 
Thompson, James D. 1967. Organizations In Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative 
Theory. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
 
Tibbetts, Stephen G., and David L. Myers. 1999. “Low Self-Control, Rational Choice, and 






Tompkins, Elizabeth. 2015. “A Quantitative Reevaluation of Radical Flank Effects within 
Nonviolent Campaigns.” Pp. 103–35 in Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and 
Change. Vol. 38, Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change. Emerald Group 
Publishing Limited. 
 
Ullrich, Robert A., and George F. Wieland. 1980. Organization Theory and Design. Rev. ed. 
Homewood, Ill: R. D. Irwin. 
 
Wade, Sara Jackson, and Dan Reiter. 2007. “Does Democracy Matter?: Regime Type and 
Suicide Terrorism.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(2):329–48. doi: 
10.1177/0022002706298137. 
 
Wilkinson, Paul. 2011. Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. 3rd ed. 
Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, [England] ; New York: Routledge. 
 
Wright, Bradley R. E., Avshalom Caspi, Terrie E. Moffitt, and Ray Paternoster. 2004. “Does the 
Perceived Risk of Punishment Deter Criminally Prone Individuals? Rational Choice, Self-
Control, and Crime.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 41(2):180–213. doi: 
10.1177/0022427803260263. 
 
Young, Joseph K., and Laura Dugan. 2014. “Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups 



























APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES, CLASSIFICATION, MEASUREMENT 
 












● 0: Did Not 
Politicize 














● 0: Group Does 
Not Have 
NVPA 














● 0: 1-100 
● 1: 101-1000  
● 2: 1001-10000 






















● GTD ● Ratio  ● Targets 
Group 
Lifespan (IV) 
● End of 
Terror 
Dataset 
● Interval  ● Lifespan 
 
